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Jo Ann Ferdinand
Brooklyn Treatment Court
There was a lot of talk at the conference this morning and yester-
day about coercion, and I was thinking that from the judicial per-
spective, there isn't a day when I do not speak to an audience that
is only present because of coercion. The lawyers are there on pain
of monetary sanctions. The defendants are there so that they don't
get warrants. Even the court staff are there so that they get paid.
So it is really quite a treat to be speaking to a voluntary audience
and impressive that you all showed up after lunch.
I do want to add my thanks to Fordham University Law School
for holding this Symposium on an issue for which I have a great
deal of passion.
I preside in the Brooklyn Treatment Court, which is in Kings
County here in New York City. We were the first treatment court
to open in the City of New York and continue to be one of the
largest in the country. Since we opened about six years ago, I have
sent over 2000 people to substance abuse treatment- programs and
have seen over 700 of them successfully complete the Court's long-
term treatment mandates.
Our court in Brooklyn was created really in response to the real-
ity of the criminal justice situation, the fact that at least, in New
York City, upwards of seventy percent of people who are arrested
test positive for drug use, so that a substantial number of people
caught up in the criminal justice system are there as a result of their
own need to feed their addiction.
We knew that the traditional criminal justice responses to these
individuals were simply not working. Whether I sent people to
prison, placed them on probation, or ordered them to do commu-
nity service, if their underlying issue of addiction was not ad-
dressed, they would continue to commit crimes and therefore
appear back in my court.
The Treatment Court in Brooklyn was developed with a system-
wide approach. Our theory is that if people are arrested for crimes
and are substance abusers, they should be treated in the criminal
justice system with a view towards their disease. They should be
offered an opportunity to deal with their addiction and should be
rewarded for doing so with a favorable resolution of their criminal
case.
From the judicial point of view, I think there are three aspects of
presiding in a drug court which are immensely rewarding. The first
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is that it improves judicial decision-making by allowing me to make
informed decisions. That is what I thought the job of a judge was:
to make informed decisions. In fact, the reality of the situation in
the criminal justice system is that you are making decisions with a
minimal amount of information. This information is funneled by
people who obviously have inconsistent points of view, while in a
drug treatment court you are the recipient of information that
comes from defense attorneys, the district attorney, and treatment
providers who have exchanged all of the information at their dispo-
sal so that, in providing all of the information to the Court, we can
together attempt to make a better decision.
Knowledge and sharing of facts really informs my decision, and
when you add to that a knowledge of addiction and recovery, it
means that the decisions can be that much more logical. A knowl-
edge of addiction and recovery is really a crucial part of it. I heard
somebody say earlier today that the lack of knowledge of addiction
and recovery really permeates the criminal justice system, and I
was a judge who allowed people an opportunity to go to treatment
if they begged, if their lawyer pleaded, and if the DA was finally
convinced. But I only allowed them a single chance. I thought that
was what was appropriate, and I had no idea that recovery was not
an event, but a process.
Therefore, a part of a problem-solving court is learning about
things that go beyond the traditional knowledge of a judge-learn-
ing about the social science of treatment, learning about the hard
science of addiction.
The other way in which decision-making is improved in a drug
treatment court is that you get the opportunity to make decisions
that are not only legally correct but fair. I have never heard myself
say in the six years I have been in the Treatment Court something
that I said on many, many occasions in the past: "I am constrained
by the law not to grant that motion" or "I am unable to reach some
conclusion despite the obvious fairness of that result."
Well, that doesn't happen in a drug treatment court because we
operate under a framework which is legally correct and then we are
able to make decisions that are appropriate, fair, and take into ac-
count people's lives and the effect of the criminal justice system on
their lives.
An amazing thing happens in a drug treatment court and that is
when we all share the same goal; that is, the successful completion
of a treatment mandate, you find that parties freed from their
traditional constraints can really work together, so that you have
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defense lawyers who no longer ask you to release someone from
jail to go live with a drug-abusing spouse. You have defense attor-
neys who work with the treatment providers to ask that the person
be released from jail to live in a drug-free environment.
You have police officers who come into court and no longer say,
"This person gave me a hard time. I'm just waiting for you to put
him in jail, judge." You have police officers who come into court
and say, "Excuse me, judge. I picked this person up from his treat-
ment program, and I promised I would bring them back." You
have DAs who stand up in court, as I had on one occasion, and say,
"Today I am dismissing twelve felonies and feeling that this is a job
well done." By freeing people from their traditional roles, it allows
us to make better decisions.
I think the third way in which the decision-making for a judge is
improved is that the outcomes are satisfying, and by that I mean
the outcomes make sense. As I said before, traditional sentences
don't always make sense. It does not make sense to place someone
on probation knowing that they are going to continue to use drugs.
It does not make sense to put someone in jail because they have a
disease, knowing that it is not going to be dealt with.
In my court I have found that at least eighty-eight percent of the
people I have sent to treatment have completed four months of
treatment. I have found that even the people who are unable to
complete the mandate have improved outcomes.
The recidivism rate in a traditional court is, I think, somewhere
between thirty and fifty percent of people released from jail are re-
arrested within a year. Recidivism among drug court graduates in
my court is about ten percent.
There are clear cost savings to a drug treatment court. The sav-
ings of prison cost is obvious, but there are health savings, drug-
free babies, and children who can live with their parents and are
not left in the foster care system.
In conclusion, I just want to go back for a moment to that notion
of coercion. You know, most of us thought before drug treatment
courts that people would not go to treatment unless they had hit
bottom. When I took a look at the people I have seen in my court,
fifty percent of them have a severe addiction and fifty percent of
them have previous criminal convictions, and the median number
of years they have been using drugs is eighteen years.
If those people haven't hit bottom, I am not sure who has. Of
those people, fifty percent never sought treatment before they
2014
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found their way into my court. And, when offered an opportunity
to go to treatment, ninety percent of them have accepted that offer.
Although there is coercion, in fact it is a decision made by peo-
ple who, when offered a real opportunity to get help and salvage
their lives, have taken advantage of the opportunity.
From my perspective, having sat in this court, it is better for deci-
sion-making, better for the court system, and clearly better for
society.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
William Schma
Kalamazoo County Circuit Court
I am a circuit court judge in Kalamazoo County, Michigan, and
that is our general court of jurisdiction comparable to your su-
preme court here.
I came at this issue from the drug treatment court perspective
and started that about eleven years ago now, in 1991. In
Kalamazoo, we began with the first court in the country that was
gender-specific, that was for women. After that we started a court
for men, and we've kept them separate, gender-specific, since then
for a lot of reasons, and have also added a court for juveniles.
After some time spent with the drug treatment court movement,
I got involved with and interested in therapeutic jurisprudence be-
cause of its wider applications, which then led to notions of prob-
lem-solving courts. And so that is kind of what brings me here.
I go to the theme of the conference, I guess, starting out, and
note that it is talking about the movement from adversarial litiga-
tion to innovative jurisprudence. In my little spiel here, I will try to
emphasize what I consider to be the innovative aspects of what it is
that we are trying to do with problem-solving courts, limited not
just to drug courts, I hope, but other ideas as well.
I would suggest that this is an evolving science and an evolving
practice, and we are far from where we will be ten years from now,
probably far from where we will be five years from now. A lot has
happened in ten years, when I look back at the things that people
have done in that period of time.
But with that all being said, I would like to risk some copyright
infringement of Mr. Covey and give you my seven highly effective
traits of problem-solving courts. If I run out of time, it may be only
four or five.
First of all, these traits, none of them really stand alone. They
are all interwoven, they kind of relate to each other and move back
and forth with each other.
The first one that stands out in my mind is that an effective prob-
lem-solving court reflects a system mentality, not an individual,
segmented, kind of bucket-to-bucket, as I usually like to describe
it, mentality where we have in the past passed people from each of
our respective buckets, done a really good job of processing them
through it, from the police to the prosecutor to the court, and we
keep dumping it down the line, and then it finally ends up back
with the police in the streets.
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That model is, I think, defective and needs to be changed such
that it would reflect that we work in a system and that that system
has the court at the center of it as the convener of the system's
activities. Now, a lot of people get twitchy about the court being
involved in administrative behavior at that point. It is good that
people do get twitchy about these things, because it is a huge leap
for the court to act as a convener of various agency activities in the
community.
It is successful; it works. We're very proud of what was done
before, and in some circumstances it works wonderfully, and it is
the only way to do it, but in many circumstances it doesn't work
well. Part of the evolving process is, I think, to find out when the
system approach is appropriate and when it is not appropriate, and
there will be some situations where it is not, and we have to simply
avoid talking about problem-solving courts in those contexts and, if
necessary, resort to the traditional models.
Part of the system approach is that we grow in self-awareness
and in our self-understanding of who we are and what it is that we
do as individuals. You know, one of the things that always amazes
me is every time we get a new bar president in Michigan, the first
thing they do is wring their hands over the deplorable state of the
lawyers in our community and public attitudes towards lawyers.
The second thing that they do is they go out and hire a public
relations expert to improve their image. And the third thing they
do is they spend a lot of money on that. And the fourth thing that
happens is the people still don't like the lawyers.
Now, if that doesn't finally get people in the legal profession to
start thinking about themselves and who they are and who the pub-
lic, their customers, perceive them to be, I don't know what will. If
we are not perceived as being customer-responsive and commu-
nity-responsive, the fault is not with the community, it is with
ourselves.
I think a big part of this system attitude is to look at ourselves,
define ourselves, think in new ways about who we are and try to
work them into a kind of mentality so that we can, as Judge Ferdi-
nand suggests, free people from their traditional roles so that they
can work together in this system.
This has to start at every level. It. has to exist at every level. It
has to occur at every level. That means it has to be taught in the
law schools. I am fortunate enough to be teaching therapeutic ju-
risprudence in a college right now, at a university in Kalamazoo,
which thrills me, because I want to send these people to the folks in
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the law schools and the people in the police academies and the
people in the corrections field asking a lot of questions about these
things and their role in the system.
But it certainly has a place and has to belong in the law schools
themselves so that lawyers will begin to receive training in healing
skills, emotional skills, collaborative skills.
We haven't been receiving that in the past, and we've got to get
past the stage where therapeutic jurisprudence and those kinds of
things are simply seminar courses that a few goofballs take because
they don't want to take some other seminar course. These have to
be part of the traditional role of raising lawyers so that it become a
part of their self-concept and they understand how they fit into the
social system.
One of the things that irritates the daylights out of me with
judges is that, when they are exposed to some of these ideas, they
will complain that they are not social workers. Well, when, obvi-
ously, seventy percent or more of the people that appear in front of
me have social problems that have brought them there, you had
better believe I am a social worker, and I had better have social-
worker skills in order to address what it is that those people bring
to me.
Justice Richard Goldstone, who is a member of the Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa, said that we are really aggressive in
understanding the law for its retributive powers and its ability to
punish, but we have to understand its ability to heal. And I would
suggest that that is a part of that self-concept.
That is a part of the second of these factors, which is knowing
our clientele so that we can serve our customers. I have a New
Yorker cartoon I love to use. It is a Wild West theme in a bar. The
bartender is leaning over the bar looking at a dead man on the
floor, and there's a cowpoke there with a gun in his hand that's
smoking, and the bartender looks over at him and says, "I begged
him to get some help."
I think that is what we've done and Judge Ferdinand referred to.
We beg people to get help, and then when they don't because they
don't understand their need for that help, we shoot them and we
put them out of commission. That simply is a lack of knowing what
our clientele is, so you have to understand that.
This notion of due process is an important idea. We judges obvi-
ously have to protect our role as the dispensers of due process.
That comes from administering good and appropriate therapeutic
jurisprudence. Therapeutic jurisprudence that becomes some no-
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tion of therapeutic justice that spills over into paternalism is simply
wrong and it is unconstitutional, and we have to avoid that.
On the other hand, due process never has been a static idea. If it
has meant in the past fairness and equality, there is no reason why
we cannot also try to expand our understanding of due process to
come to appreciate the fact that it means that people that are given
equal and fair treatment are also entitled to appropriate treatment
under the law, and I suggest that that is a notion of due process
that we should pursue.
Justice Holmes said that the life of the law has always had more
to do with human experience than it has the syllogism, and we have
to integrate that kind of thinking into our behavior in the court
system.
We have to learn from the medical community. That is another
important concept. The medical community, like us, wrongfully fo-
cused only on curing disease for a long time. There is a Dr. David
Sack, a Canadian physician, who talks about three factors that phy-
sicians have to be familiar with. It is not just pathology or disease
but it is also predicament and experience.
We have the same issues to deal with in the courts, and good
problem-solving courts understand that, that the pathology,
whatever it is that has brought somebody into the traditional court
system, is not all that the person presents to us when we deal with
them. We deal with their predicaments, their illnesses, their insur-
ance problems, their employment problems, and good problem-
solving courts are able to address all of this.
We are really good at institutionalizing shame and blame rituals
in our secular culture. We have to learn in problem-solving courts
to institutionalize redemptive symbols as well, and rituals. Drug
treatment courts do that. Reentry courts do that. They bring peo-
ple back and celebrate their redemption. We are talking about re-
deeming individuals. There is no reason that we can't
institutionalize those symbols just like we have the negative ones.
We also have to learn to apply, as Judge Ferdinand has sug-
gested, just plain old common sense. It doesn't make sense to do
things the way that we have been for as long as we have been,
getting the same results. We have to have the courage and the
moral fortitude to, within the bounds of the law. It is absolutely
appropriate, as Judge Ferdinand said; this can be done within the
bounds of the law and is done all the time with legal strictures-
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pursue these goals. And if we do, I think we will supervise the
health of the patients and their return to health rather than their
demise.
PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS
James A. Yates
New York County Supreme Court
This panel has been asked to provide a judicial perspective on
the shift from adversarial litigation to innovative jurisprudence.
I come before you with a cautionary perspective, a concern that
fundamental values and ethical principles are at risk as therapeutic
justice expands. Since I am sensitive to the fact that problem-solv-
ing courts are popular and do perform certain functions well, and
that my criticism may be unpopular, let my begin by acknowledg-
ing the benefits of these courts.
When properly funded, framed, and limited in scope, they pro-
vide an escape from unnecessary protracted litigation. They pro-
vide a useful dynamic-that is, counsel and a judge who are
attuned to changing evolving situations, drug treatment, family
conflict, homelessness, mental illness, and they work together to
adjust their response to those changes.
They provide positive outcomes: treatment, community service,
counseling, restitution, all in place of the hopeless jail or no-jail
dilemma with otherwise confronts judges who sentence minor
offenders.
I applaud all of this. However, as a philosophical matter, I do
not believe that the ends can be used to justify the means, and I do
not believe that an outcome-oriented justice model founded solely
on regularized coercion as a means to an end should be expanded
beyond the low-level infractions it was intended to address.
My greatest concern is that as we look to apply the model to
more serious offenses, we slide into acceptance of a false dichot-
omy. We are told that we can have an adversarial system or we can
have thoughtful dispositions and outcomes, but we cannot have
both. Why? Those of us who love the law and cherish the Ameri-
can justice system cannot succumb to the argument that we must
choose between respect for fundamental rights and a presumption
of innocence on the one hand and sensible outcomes on the other.
It cannot be that principled adjudication and intelligent disposi-
tions are incompatible. In an ideal world, every court would be a
problem-solving court and a forum for just determinations as well.
Courts would fairly adjudicate factual disputes, let the parties be
heard, apply the law, and, upon a finding of guilt, impose thought-
ful sanctions that benefit the parties and the community.
Unfortunately, problem-solving courts are often founded on the
premise that all who enter are guilty and must abandon all hope or
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vindication of rights. The adjudicative function is bypassed. Prob-
lem solving courts too often treat concern for process and assertion
of rights as though they were the problem.
This occurs for two separate and distinct reasons. In lower
courts inundated with petty offenses, overworked administrators
do not have the time or resources for due process. In theory,
judges in lower courts could adjudicate and then sanction with
care. Instead, they are told that litigants cannot have both hearings
and solutions.
In superior courts, where I work, the problem is even more per-
nicious. In New York, as a result of mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing laws, such as the Rockefeller drug laws, one adversary holds
the keys to the doors for jail or treatment. It is an interested party,
not the judge or administrators, who decides when creative solu-
tions can be employed.
In superior courts, a defendant is told by his adversary to "aban-
don litigation and return for treatment," not because the system is
overburdened or because that choice is good for the community
but merely because the district attorney demands it.
If we cared enough, we could create a system where a criminal
defendant could be heard to complain when her rights were vio-
lated and then demand that the state afford due process before
taking liberty or property, and follow this with an appropriate sys-
tem of reward and punishment.
I am not against compelled treatment. I use it every day, just as
Judge Ferdinand does, and I know it works. I am not against re-
storative justice. I just don't accept that it can only come at the
expense of justice itself.
I sit in supreme court in New York County. The cases I see are
felonies. Let me focus on the problems I see when the therapeutic
model is superimposed upon a flawed foundation of mandatory
minimum sentencing.
The defendants I see are, more often than not, repeat offenders.
In the vast majority of cases, because of mandatory sentencing and
plea-bargaining restrictions, an assistant district attorney, not the
judge, decides what options are available for sentence.
We have a form of a problem-solving court. If an assistant dis-
trict attorney allows it, alternatives to incarceration are permitted,
either by way of deferred sentence, where a person earns escape
from incarceration by performing certain duties, or by direct impo-
sition of an alternative sentence.
2022
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An assistant district attorney decides whether a person can enter
a treatment program, receive counseling, make restitution, or per-
form community service. The assistant district attorney, not the
judge, decides how long the period of incarceration will be.
I reserve detailed commentary on the need for restoring judicial
discretion for another forum, but suffice it to say that an assistant's
decision is not guided by any rule of law. It can remain arbitrary,
unexplained, and it is unreviewable.
I supervise a number of deferred-sentence cases, arrangements
where an addict receives treatment, a juvenile receives training, a
person with mental or emotional problems receives counseling, and
cases where restitution or community service are performed over a
period of time.
For all of those cases where prison was otherwise a required al-
ternative, there are four critical points of adjudication: entry, main-
tenance, completion, and sanction upon failure. Someone needs to
decide who gets in, who is failing, when ultimate success has been
achieved, and what punishment should follow upon disregard or
failure. These are critical moments in the progress of any case if a
court seeks to solve a problem.
Any principled system of justice would assign those critical deci-
sions to a neutral and detached arbiter. It is not just a matter of
fairness, but I have learned over time that ineffective treatment
follows when the subject feels he is not being treated fairly.
However, since the assistant district attorney controls the out-
come, they seize control of those four decision-making moments.
The outcome then becomes based on adversarial desires, not the
needs of the defendant or of the community.
It is ironic that this forum assumes we are "moving," in its title,
from an adversarial system to a therapeutic model. My experience
with deferred-sentencing programs and DTAP programs in New
York is not that we have dropped the adversarial system. To the
contrary, we have empowered one adversary and handicapped the
other. That does mean we have ended adversity.
A few examples may prove useful. First I will address entry. In
order to escape unnecessary incarceration or receive treatment,
under most DTAP contracts the defendant is told he cannot apply
for bail, cannot testify in the grand jury, cannot move to suppress
illegally obtained evidence, cannot complain about an involuntary
confession, cannot complain of speedy-trial violations, cannot chal-
lenge the sufficiency of evidence in the grand jury, and definitely
cannot seek a jury trial.
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Instead, he must sign a contract waiving those rights and confess
to the charge. If he has the misfortune to have been arrested with
a co-defendant, he is often told he must implicate the co-defen-
dant. If he refuses to do this, whether out of obstinacy, fear, or
maybe just because he is telling the truth, he is denied a program.
As well, he is likely to be denied an alternative sentence if his co-
defendant refuses to join in the agreement, through no fault of the
defendant, because it is inconvenient for the prosecutor to split
cases.
If he was overcharged; that is, his participation was minimal or
mitigating or exculpating factors exist, he must nonetheless confess
to the charge, waiving any defenses and appeals. On occasion, this
means treatment begins with a lie. In order to participate-and I
see it every day-defendants admit to the top charge when they
were probably guilty of less.
None of these requirements are essential to treatment or serve
the public welfare, but they satisfy the district attorney's needs.
They are not therapeutic. I appreciate that contrition and accept-
ance of responsibility are part of rehabilitation. But the contract
requirements I described go far beyond the simple truth.
Second point, maintenance. Any deferred sentence comes with
a certain probability that there will be slippage, occasional setbacks
in treatment or performance. A true problem-solving court uses a
carrot-and-stick approach, a system of graduated responses, to ulti-
mately reform the offender.
However, the unfortunate reality of most deferred sentences
controlled by an assistant is they are constructed and written in a
way that an assistant can unilaterally and arbitrarily demand pun-
ishment for even minor noncompliance, without regard to oppos-
ing counsel, if they happen to show up, and without regard to
judicial concerns.
I have seen assistants, usually youthful and inexperienced, who
were raised in communities and circumstances far different from
those of the defendant, proudly invoke zero-tolerance policies. I
have seen, for example, a case where a women stricken with cancer
was prescribed a painkiller but was dropped from the program be-
cause it was inconsistent with the treatment, and the assistant de-
manded jail as the alternative.
I am going to skip through some parts but I do want to mention
the two last points, completion and sanction upon failure.
Again, since the district attorney is the sole arbiter of a contract
in a DTAP case, she decides when the case is over and whether the
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defendant has earned dispensation. Since the standard contract
calls for imprisonment of three to four years unless the defendant
successfully completes the program, a frequent phenomenon oc-
curs that I call moving the goal line-the prosecutor will demand
things which were unanticipated or not included in the original
contract.
For instance, years after a person has entered a drug treatment
program and moved to independent living and a drug-free environ-
ment, there is a demand that they pass an English course or obtain
a GED or have a certain level of savings in a bank account. Now,
it may be that these are all good things, but they represent a new
level of control by the assistant well beyond the initial decision by
the defendant to become drug free and participate in treatment at
the expense of risk of jail.
I offer this as another example of how problem-solving, the
ideal, can become corrupted when the promise of collaborative de-
cision-making is lost and handed to one party in the system.
And finally, sanction upon failure. The standard deferred-sen-
tence contract in New York County specifies that the sentence will
be imposed if the assistant district attorney determines that the de-
fendant has failed or not successfully completed the program. Usu-
ally for a minor drug sale or possession with intent, that means four
and a half to nine years' imprisonment. The judge as well as the
parties sign this at the outset of the program.
This is a complete abdication of judicial discretion, sponsored
and encouraged, unfortunately, by the defendant, who is eager to
get into the program. It happens on occasion that a person is
brought to court years after signing a contract. A hundred impor-
tant changes may have occurred in that person's life, some good,
some bad, but the court has contracted to give a particular sen-
tence designated years ago in advance without regard to those
factors.
I have concentrated just on the drug treatment issues because
that is what people have spoken about. If I had more time, I would
complain also about fragmentation, I would complain about diver-
sion of limited resources, and I would complain about overly rig-
idly bureaucratic rules which artificially consign cases to one part
when it may not be appropriate.
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Peggy Hora
Alameda County Superior Court
I am Peggy Hora, and I am a problem-solving judge.
Now, come on, you've been to twelve-step meetings, some of
you. You know what you're supposed to say in response to that.
AUDIENCE: Hi, Peggy.
JUDGE HORA: That's what you're supposed to say.
If you haven't yet read Lonny Shavelson's book, Hooked, I rec-
ommend it to you. I want to read a short passage:
Drug court teams travel to the state capital for a meeting of the
California Association of Drug Court Professionals in Decem-
ber of 1998. In the ornate ballrooms of the Doubletree Hotel,
men and women in dark business suits mingle with others in re-
laxed sportswear, Black Muslim caps, and African dashikis.
Then they all file into the chandeliered banquet hall to sit at
elaborately set tables and dine, waiting for the opening remarks
by the Honorable Darrell Stevens. Judge Stevens, a rural Butte
County Superior Court judge, lists among his ardent community
supporters such known radical organizations as the Chamber of
Commerce and the Lions Club. As the main course is served by
formally attired waiters, the dignified supervising judge for the
Butte County Drug Courts ascends the podium, adjusts the
microphone, and, in the best of revolutionary traditions, raises a
tightly clenched fist in the air, proclaiming to a boisterous outcry
from the audience, "We cannot be stopped. The momentum is
here." A sea of clenched revolutionary fists rises in the air to
join him, then returns to the chicken cordon bleu.
What happened to me and how I sort of got down this path was,
seventeen years ago, I was minding my own business being a Legal
Aid lawyer, and an opening came on the bench, and I decided to
run for it, and I was lucky enough to win.
Well, Legal Aid in California is not like Legal Aid in New York.
Legal Aid in California is all civil cases. It was housing cases, rights
benefits, unemployment insurance, and consumer contracts. I
didn't know a dog bite on a rear end from a human bite on the
nose when it came to criminal law.
Criminal lawyers all talk in numbers. I had no idea that numbers
could be verbs. And I got to the bench absolutely clueless about
the people I would be dealing with.
The first year on the bench, I did what I thought I was supposed
to do, and somebody would be found guilty, either by plea or by
adjudication through trial, and I would impose a sentence, and they
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would be back in front of me before I even knew it, and I would
say, "Ha, he obviously didn't learn his lesson." So I would double
it just to show him, you know, "Yeah, I'm real serious here, guy."
And then, a few months later, guess who was back again?
After about a year of this, I said, "Whoa! Something is so wrong
here, because if this were happening to me, I would stop doing
what that person is doing. So what is going on with these folks that
is so terribly different from my whole life and world experience?"
I started reading about alcohol and other drugs. I started look-
ing at issues of addiction. I went to my first seminar on the subject
in 1987. By 1991, Jeff Tauber and I had chaired the first seminar, a
statewide conference, on drugs for the state of California. We had
never gotten any training on drugs, if you can imagine. When
ninety percent of our cases in criminal law, seventy percent in abu-
sive neglect-you know the statistics, I don't have to tell you-are
grounded in issues around substance abuse, we knew nothing, ab-
solutely nothing.
Also by then, the Miami Dade court had started the drug treat-
ment court, and we started the one in Oakland, California, which
was the first in California and the second in the nation.
When we had that conference and we brought in researchers like
Dr. Doug England (phonetic) from UCLA to talk about how co-
erced treatment works, to talk about the DUF statistics, as they
were called then-they are now called ADAM-looking at people
who were arrested, any given quarter for a week, and now thirty-
five sites all over the United States, and over fifty percent every
single time, sometimes as high as eighty-three percent in San Di-
ego, the meth capital of the world a few years ago-eighty-three
percent of people arrested were positive for methamphetamine-
and it doesn't even test alcohol. So just the big drugs between a
low of fifty-three percent and highs of over eighty percent, and we
started seeing how, at least in the criminal system, there was an
underlying problem that was not being adequately addressed.
Around the same time, another movement was going on called
community-oriented policing, where police officers were sick and
tired of seeing these people, as we were sick of seeing these people
come back over again. Heck, the defendants were released faster
than the officer got his report written. And so this whole new ap-
proach to problem-solving policing, problem-solving courts, before
we ever had that word, started to merge together.
The old style of policing was, "You call, we haul, that's all." And
the old style of adjudicating the cases that were appropriate for
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alternative adjudication, appropriate for treatment-see, I don't
care if Jeffrey Dahmer had a drug problem. You kill people and
chop them up and put their little burgers in the freezer; you go into
jail forever, you know, you go into state prison. So I am not saying
that all these cases need to be adjudicated with an alternative view
to treatment when it is not appropriate, when the other crimes are
so severe that it doesn't matter whether that's the problem.
I think you have to triage these cases. But the everyday low-
level crimes, either felonies or misdemeanors, that we adjudicate
day in and day out, it seemed to me, deserved some sort of special
attention to see if this stuff would work.
The other thing that was happening at the same time was the
Decade of the Brain. The nineties were the time when we learned
more about this little gray matter up here than we ever knew
before. PET scans had been developed so we could actually look
in and give somebody a dose of cocaine, pay them to take co-
caine-gosh, what a job, huh?-and watch the image on the screen
of twenty-seven of the thirty-two reward-and-pleasure centers light
up, and say, "Whew! This is a pretty strong drug."
So we learned more about addiction. We learned more based on
hard science and good facts about how to approach these things
than we ever knew before. And there have been attempts made
for decades to try to address these problems, the old farms, as you
know, for the heroin addicts, for people who were addicted prima-
rily at first to morphine. They were addicted because the doctors
that prescribed the morphine didn't know it was even addictive. So
we tried these things, but we didn't have the knowledge that we
finally had in the nineties.
What comes out of that? What comes out of that is a drug treat-
ment court which can either be pre-plea or post-adjudication. It
can either be for felonies or misdemeanors. I think everybody gets
much too hung up on whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor be-
cause it is a legislative decision that is not based on anything having
to do with treatment.
In my state, if I catch you holding the cocaine before you've used
it, it's a felony. If you're caught after you use the cocaine and
you're loaded out of your mind, it's a misdemeanor. So one you
can go to state prison for three years and one you can go to jail for
a year. Okay, how does that make any sense? One is a minimum
ninety days in county jail if you're caught loaded, and there is no
minimum if you're caught before you use it. How does that make
any sense?
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Same chemical, cocaine, same little scientific notation. Rock it
up, it's twice the sentence than if you snort it up. So we're punish-
ing the route of ingestion of the same chemical in disparate ways.
You look around and you see the jail population explode to two
million, and you've heard all the statistics for the last day or so, and
you say, "This makes no sense." You see disproportionate num-
bers of people of color incarcerated.
I started looking at issues like the criminal prosecution of preg-
nant women who had used drugs during their pregnancy, and guess
what? Out of the over 400 prosecutions, all but one woman has
been a woman of color. Coincidence? Maybe, but I get real con-
cerned, especially with the implications on freedom-of-choice is-
sues, when women are being punished differently than men.
I came to this from a bunch of different directions, and I was
very happy to be able to start what is now the fourth specific drug
treatment court in our county, and I just want to tell you a little bit
about my court.
Sue Finlay and I bunked at some conference or other, and at
three in the morning, in the dark, we're still talking, saying, "You
know, we really need to get to sleep now, but you know what one
of my guys did the other day?"
I did a national survey with a social science friend, and we sur-
veyed judges; judges in drug treatment courts, judges in traditional
family courts, and judges in unified family courts, some of which
applied the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence as Professor
Babb talked about this morning, and, to no one's surprise, we
found out judges who were working therapeutically had more job
satisfaction, were happier little souls, felt that what they did was
more productive.
All three courts felt it was the role of the court to help people.
The other two kinds of courts, not so much the unified family
courts and then the lowest poor souls, the un-unified family judges,
were so dissatisfied with their ability to deliver on what they felt
was the promise of being actually able to help people. So that re-
search is published in Court Review.
I am going to leave you with one final story. Rodney is a person
who has been battling with his schizophrenia since he was seven-
teen years old. He is now thirty-seven. He doesn't have very good
social skills. He also uses crack cocaine when his medicines aren't
working so well, and that's most of the time. Rodney is a huge
chemical mess, and we keep trying to adjust his meds and get him
to a place where he can do better and function better.
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Two Thursdays ago was Valentine's Day, and it was one of Rod-
ney's regular reporting days, and so I called his name, and he came
up, and instead of stopping at the defense table, he kept walking
toward the bench. Well, in regular court, my 230-pound, 6-foot-6
bailiff would have been on him like a dirty shirt, but he knows to
leave him alone in drug treatment court.
Rodney came up and he handed me a dozen pink carnations. I
said, "Are those for me, Rodney?" and he said, "Yes, they are."
And it wasn't about me feeling good, although I did feel good. It
was about Rodney being able to plan something, which for him is
very complex, execute it, make eye contact, and actually have a
human interaction.
His social worker recently told me that since he has been in drug
treatment court, unlike every other year of the twenty years he has
battled in schizophrenia, he has never been hospitalized.
Is this our problem in the courts? Should we be doing all this?
Should we be the ones to be providing these social services and
interventions? I don't know. But I will tell you one thing. Nobody
else is doing it, and if not us, who? And if not now, when?
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John Martin
Institute for Court Management
Now, you have to make a real change in perspective here. You
have to look at me as the embodiment of every chief judge or pre-
siding judge of every trial court across the country, large and small,
all right? The judicial perspective I am going to give is that of this
collective mass of presiding judges and administrative judges, su-
pervising judges, who are responsible for somehow figuring out the
allocation of resources, the distribution of authority, trying to run
an entire court system. So think of me now as this super-embodi-
ment of presiding judgeness around the country.
I have spent the last few years trying to collect the comments of
these people as they have tried to grapple with institutional change,
as problem-solving courts in various places have attempted to be-
come more institutionalized and as they have attempted to be in-
troduced. So think of that bigger perspective for a moment.
What I am going to try to do is the following: I am going to raise
five or six general areas of concern that judges with administrative
responsibility for entire court systems often have. Then, after I go
through those four or five, I am going to talk a little bit about what
they might mean for the elements in a broader strategy for thinking
about the implementation of innovations like problem-solving
courts. So we will do two things here.
And, by the way, because I am the embodiment of all these peo-
ple, when you want to complain about my comments, complain to
your own presiding judge rather than me.
The five areas are, first: One of the things that I often hear from
these folks is, How does your problem-solving effort fit in with the
mission of our court? Now, most of you who have been involved in
the problem-solving field get real tired of hearing that question.
But I have to emphasize that that question is still out there and is
not going to go away.
The more narrow aspect of that question is, "How does what you
are proposing to me, judge, how does it fit into our strategic direc-
tion of our court at the moment?" Let me give you some exam-
ples. I was fortunate to have been involved in the implementation
of many of these programs over the last number of decades, in fact,
and in King County, Washington, for example, which was the home
for really either the first or second mental health court.
Its implementation occurred in a very specific context, and it is
important to remember that context, that as they implemented the
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mental health court in King County, which is largely Seattle and
the suburbs, there were some other very specific goals that were
embedded into the notion of implementing their mental health
court. It served a lot of other purposes.
They wanted to do the good things. They wanted to address a
population that was woefully not being served and so on and so
forth. At the same time, though, there were other goals that were
part of that program. In particular, they had experienced tremen-
dous declines in caseload, like many courts across the country.
Don't forget that just as many courts are experiencing declining
caseloads as increasing caseloads. They suddenly had excess capac-
ity. They were in a position where they could actually figure out
not just that something needed to be done, but that they were in a
position where they were actually able to do something about it.
The second goal was they were able to recognize that it fulfilled
some of their other goals about outreach to the community, about
access to justice and serving unserved populations, and finally, it
gave them an opportunity to work with the superior court in ways
that they had not been able to work with before. So it served a lot
of other goals.
I think if you go to most examples of innovation in problem-
solving court, there are example after examples of the need to deal
with multiple goals which often reach far beyond the immediate
goals of the program, and that is something that chief judges, pre-
siding judges, ask about all the time. I am not going to go into too
many other examples, but I think, if you go back to Miami Dade or
any of these, there are many, many things going on.
The second is, if I am a chief judge, I want to know as best as you
can possibly tell me what is the extent of the infrastructure re-
quired to really make this thing work.
What is the extent of the infrastructure required to make the
thing work? And this is a tough question and it is one, frankly, that
we've gotten better at trying to identify as time goes on.
By infrastructure I mean both the hard infrastructure of the
technology, the facilities, the equipment, but also the softer infra-
structure. Do we have the staff and, more importantly, are the
staff trained, are the judges trained in a way that they have the
knowledge to provide the kinds of services that we are promising
people that we are going to provide?
Let me just mention some of the other areas of infrastructure
that are often brought up. It's the planning. Are we able, for ex-
ample, to plan with other agencies? Many, many jurisdictions find
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that the introduction of problem-solving courts produces a crisis in
planning where for the first time they really have to do some long-
range and strategic planning with justice agencies and treatment
providers in ways that they have not done before.
Second is just the management itself: Can I really supervise
other agencies in the way that I need to be able to make these
things work?
The policymaking is the third and the decision-making that re-
quires changes in the way some other folks are going to be making
decisions, both within and outside the court. There are tremen-
dous issues of coordination and communication.
I talked about staffing and training. Other people have talked
here about the finance and budgeting. There are lots of budgeting-
related issues, and it is not just the amount, it is the flexibility. You
mentioned the flexibility to use resources, to bring resources from
other places to help support the effort. Then there is finally a
whole area of performance measurement.
The second issue, then, is a very thorough assessment of what
really is required in terms of infrastructure to make this thing
work, and do I have even a remote chance of ever having that be
adequate? Today we heard the conversations about technology,
which are very revealing. One of the biggest challenges facing
problem solving courts is in dealing with the lack of infrastructure.
We already know as time goes on that the difficulties of the tech-
nology required to get the kinds of records, the kinds of informa-
tion that are needed for judges to be able to make the decisions
that they need to make are often not there, and that is one of the
real focal points, trying to figure out how the heck do you get that.
A third area of questions center around this whole notion of sys-
tem-wide impacts. How does me working with you, the chief judge
working with some of my judges on implementing a drug court,
how is that going to affect the rest of my court system? Does that
mean-and you've all heard this-does that mean that somehow
I'm losing three bodies? You know, often that's the way. Oh my
gosh, I don't have three bodies, three judges, that I'm now able to
assign other cases to, blah, blah, blah. All these kinds of system-
wide impacts are important.
Related to that is this whole notion of recognizing that there are
also going to be unintended consequences. I have seen with the
introduction of these innovations dramatic changes in the way the
police act. They either quit arresting certain kinds of offenders
simply because they don't agree with the policy or they start to
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arrest many more kinds of offenders. But anyway, trying to antici-
pate what some of those unintended consequences might be is a
third area.
The fourth we talked about in quite a bit of detail, the whole
notion of institutionalizing and the sustainability of problem-solv-
ing courts. As we speak today, Dade County, many of their pro-
grams are threatened. As many of you know, the drug court is one
area of innovation, but a second, more recent one was they did an
awful lot of work in family court, and they were able to get essen-
tial case managers in the court system that were very critical to that
aspect of their problem-solving court effort.
That is all now in jeopardy as a result of moves to statewide
funding, and there are some real questions about, well, we kind of
got it sustainable for some period of time. Now how do we con-
vince people, now that we have to do it on a statewide level, that
this is valuable? Somehow it has resulted in that court having to
make a pitch for problem-solving courts statewide just to be able to
maintain what it has in its own jurisdiction. So there are often
these kinds of things.
I see people from California smiling. One of my clients is the
Los Angeles Superior Court. This is the story of our life at this
point in Los Angeles, trying to figure out how do we make all this
stuff fit together, sustainable, at a time when we're going through
this whole notion of unification and state funding.
The fifth point, and I am not even going to dwell on this one, but
the point is whether these lead to better outcomes is something
that we really do have to get a handle on. Frankly, it's this whole
notion of having consistent outcomes that we hold the entire sys-
tem to the same standards that we're holding our problem-solving
courts to.
There are three things that we should do as we take all this into
account when we develop new strategies.
The first, in my mind, is forget talking about problem-solving
courts as a generic term or as a phenomenon. I think there is not
much utility in that anymore. We've seen within the drug court
context, for example, that there is such a divergence in the models
used that in some cases you don't want to be hooked with what is
being called a drug court; in other cases, they mean such totally
different things.
The bottom line there is you have to get into details about who
you're really targeting in any of these activities, what your out-
comes are, and really, a lot of talk about the infrastructure and
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what that might look like. So, from here on out, in my mind, I
would quit using the word "problem-solving court."
There is also something that we talked about with a number of
people, this notion that the proliferation of the term, it doesn't ap-
ply to the same things. You're losing meaning, you're losing the
spirit and enthusiasm that may be there. It may be inappropriate
to use at all.
The first piece of my strategy is get rid of the term "problem-
solving courts" unless you're in a position where you can go into
great detail about what you really mean specifically, problem-solv-
ing court in condition X, Y, and Z.
The second is this whole notion that we have to recognize that
this is not going to reform the courts in general. To put on the
burden of this thing we're not calling problem-solving courts any-
more, the burden that somehow that is going to address all the
problems that have emerged and frankly not been addressed in the
bigger venue of court reform is ludicrous and one that we really do
need to quit doing.
Let me give you some examples. In the thirty years I have been
involved, I am so offended by the changes in discretion and author-
ity of the courts and the judges. That is something we have to con-
front directly in other ways. That's a horrible issue area and one
that we have to deal with and have to have the guts to deal with in
ways that we haven't been in the last twenty years, instead of think-
ing that we're going to be able to do it through the back door of
something else.
You can go through example after example where we really need
to get back to the business of court reform as well as problem-
solving in the same breath.
Now, I want to extend that even further. A lot of you are way
too willing to undertake the burdens of society. Mental health?
How did we get in this mental health business? There is another
dimension of reform that maybe we need to be involved in a little
different way than thinking that we're going to be able to resolve
these things from the standpoint of mental health courts.
The reality is that there is so much change in mental health law,
as you know, but the other side of the equation was not followed
through where facilities, the alternatives for supporting people with
mental illness, haven't arisen. Well, maybe we need to recognize
that we really are in the mental health reform business, but we can-
not do that just through the court; we have to do that in a different
way.
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The final thing may be the most difficult, and that is trying to
anticipate the future. You all are going to have to become futurists
to some extent. Just as we now know a lot more, for example,
about the dynamics of substance abuse and addiction and all those
kinds of things, there are things emerging now that we need to be
able to know more about, and we need to start to build in the po-
tential implications for that now instead of later.
Let me give you a couple of examples. This is a whole other
series of lectures. But because of some other sorts of genetic and
nano-engineering and things like that, the effects of substance use,
the reasons why people get high, there's possibilities of introducing
those effects that do not involve the fairly frequent introduction of
substances into people's bodies.
What do you do when, for example, people can have some way
of electronically stimulating the kinds of things that trigger the
same responses that substance use does today, those kinds of
things? Well, these are not-we all kind of laugh and we think,
"Uh," but the reality is that those are not very far on the horizon.
JUDGE HORA: Do you mean Woody Allen is right: We will
have an orgasmatron?
JUDGE MARTIN: Exactly. Those kinds of things are some-
thing that we need to start to anticipate and look at what that
might mean for the models that we have. And I will end with that.
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Questions and Answers
QUESTION: What is the possibility of mainstreaming through-
out the courts the principles of problem-solving courts and inte-
grating those successfully into mainstream courts?
JUDGE FERDINAND: Brooklyn is now in the midst of open-
ing a court which will attempt to take the drug treatment court
model and make it available to every case, every nonviolent case,
that comes into the courts in Brooklyn.
Judge Kaye has created an office as part of her office to not only
expand drug treatment courts and problem-solving courts around
the state, but really Judge Trafficanti, who heads that, has said his
goal is to have every court be a problem-solving court. So I think
that there is a philosophy that suggests that it needs to be
expanded.
JUDGE HORA: I think one of the keys is to make sure that we
have sufficient education for all players in the system. Once you
know this stuff, you can never go back to business as usual.
There is a course at the National Judicial College, one on sub-
stance abuse, another on co-occurring mental health disorders, a
third on problem-solving courts-there are flyers out there on that.
Through Marilyn Roberts' Drug Court Program Office that we are
just about to launch, a cultural competence curriculum for all drug
courts who receive federal funding, who will be required to take
this course, and it will be offered to courts throughout the United
States, and that is something that can be used by any court, any
time.
There are courses within the National Drug Court Institute.
There are courses within their own state judicial education offices.
That is a key, I think, to integration of these ideas, because, you
know what? We get scammed all the time. You know, "I tested
dirty because I ate a poppy-seed bagel." Well, that's lovely except
for the fact that poppy seeds in this country are sterilized, and you
would have to eat a bagel the size of a Volkswagen to actually test
dirty, so don't tell me that.
But if you don't know that, and you say, "Oh, gosh, well, I won't
send a guy to jail over a bagel," well, you just got scammed. You
just got scammed big time.
JUDGE SCHMA: If I could just respond on that question of
expanding to other courts, it is certainly important for us all to re-
member that we all come from different environments. I am not
from New York, and you folks that are from New York are not
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from Michigan, and there are certain things you can do some
places that you cannot do other places.
I would tie this to something I think Professor Babb said earlier
today, and that is that none of this is really going to be effective
without judicial leadership, and the legal community has to press
its judicial leaders to get involved in these kinds of things, because
without it, the lawyers won't come along, the Department of Cor-
rections officials won't come along. At least in every place that
I've seen this happen, it does not happen without judicial leader-
ship. If there is judicial leadership, that is, I believe judges are ca-
pable of creating a legal culture in their courtrooms. Judges who
are determined to do these kinds of things in other environments
than these so-called problem-solving court specialized areas,
they've got the right and the ability to insist on how people are
going to act when they come to their courtroom.
In my ordinary, regular, everyday court, whether it's a medical
malpractice lawsuit or it's a domestic relations case or it's a crimi-
nal cases, people know that they are going to be expected, the law-
yers know that they are going to be expected to deal with
substance abuse issues if they are present in this little cosmos that
is going to be brought into the courtroom.
And they come prepared for that. They ask me a lot of ques-
tions. The court becomes a referral agency. It becomes an educa-
tor. But if the court takes on that responsibility-and I think it
must and should, for all the reasons we've talked about here-it
can transfer that in many areas. It is limited only by the creativity
of the judicial leadership.
QUESTION: My question for the panel is, within your sentenc-
ing structures, do judges have any legal authority to mandate treat-
ment in correctional settings?
JUDGE YATES: The answer is yes and no, and it is sort of pa-
thetic, and that is, about five or six years ago, I forget the year, in
New York a program was started called supervised parole. There is
also a shock incarceration program. But they put so many limits
and strictures on it. One particular limit that they put on super-
vised parole, meaning a short period of incarceration and then
treatment out, is that they made the felony level so low that any-
body who sells one grain, one four-hundredth of an ounce of co-
caine or possesses with intent just a couple of grains, less than an
Equal packet, even as a first offender, cannot get in the program
without the DA's consent. So it becomes a joke.
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JUDGE HORA: The other thing you can do, however, is, as in
my county, we have a committee on the unmet need of women
prisoners, and one of the things we looked at was substance abuse
issues, being batterer survivors, parenting issues, and all those pro-
grams are now in place.
We found out when we offered parenting classes and coupled it
with contact visits with the children, the people were much more
motivated to take the classes. But guess what happened? The men
got visits every week from their kids because the wives brought
them. The women did not get a visit because nobody was bringing
those kids to her.
So what we did is we shifted them all down; we being the sheriff,
with some judicial leadership, we shifted them all down to the com-
munity reentry center. We bought a van, and we go out and get the
kids and bring them to her, so that they actually get contact visits
with their children.
We can look at things, like how pregnant women are treated in
jail, look at the miscarriage rate, and say, Why in my county was
the miscarriage rate ninety-eight percent for women who were in-
carcerated? Because there was no supervised detox for women
who were on depressants, and so forth.
We can look at being judicial leaders and having the bully pulpit
to say mandatory minimum sentencing for non-violent drug of-
fenders is wrong, it's just wrong, and we can take that stand.
There's lots we can do with judicial leadership that we may not
have the power to mandate but we have the referent power to
bring people along for.
VOICE: Last question here?
QUESTION: You've made a lot of suggestions about the areas
to extend the problem-solving model. Could you suggest areas to
which the problem-solving model should not be applied by judges
and courts?
JUDGE HORA: Well, I can. Where we don't have a good sci-
entific basis for what we're doing. The reason: looking at substance
abuse problems and mental health issues are twofold. One, it's
pernicious. It's in your courtroom every single day, so if you don't
think you have a drug court, you're wrong. If you have a criminal
court or a dependency court, you have a drug court.
But we have good science now. That is what I was talking about,
this decade of the nineties, the wonderful expansion of knowledge
about substance abuse treatment. So we shouldn't go mucking
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about with bad science where we don't know what is really good
and what is really not.
There are these mandatory batterers' treatment programs. I
have not seen sufficient evidence with which I am comfortable. I
must mandate it because that is the law, and I do, and I hound
them to do their fifty-two weeks. But I am not comfortable saying
that that works, because I have not seen data to suggest that it
does.
I would say where we have a good grounding and hard science
and we are convinced to a reasonable amount as a judge, yes, that
we can get involved. If we don't know what the Sam Hill we're
doing or it's junk science, stay the heck out.
JUDGE MARTIN: I would extend that to the notion of what's
culturally appropriate, too. I think that is one of the great chal-
lenges. I would refer to it as an infrastructure challenge, but the
notion that somehow we have the treatment, the kinds of resources
out there to really deal with diverse populations, in my experience
it is simply not true. It's not there.
JUDGE YATES: I think your question points out exactly the
problem with calling things problem-solving courts because what it
does is it envisions, instead of everybody having resources, train-
ing, and sensitivity, it envisions that somehow or other there are
classifications that should be drawn up in the abstract before
you've even seen the situation.
You know, it would be easy to sit there and say, "Oh, no. Homi-
cide should not be handled by a problem-solving court." But what
do you do when you have a 14-year-old girl who gives birth in a
locker room and then kills the baby? You're not supposed to be
sensitive, you're not supposed to be trained, you're not supposed
to have resources? It's ridiculous.
That's why it's artificial to call things problem-solving courts, be-
cause it just separates out things that are not, quote, problem-
solved.
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